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lN'rRoOUCTION 
The abolition of customs dilties and quotas, the two cIassic instru-
ments of protectionism, and also of the increasing mass of substitute. 
measures involving tax discrimination or the grant of subsidies are a 
fundamental concern of both international and regional economic 
groupings. Such action is the result of efforts, motivated by the growing 
inter-dependence of the world's economies, to supplant the nation-state, 
which is oriented towards the domestic market, with larger-sca1e eco-
nomic units. 
The code of conduct of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) and the Additional Agreement which have been "provi-
sionally applicable" since 1 January 1948, established for the first time 
the basic conditions under international law for free trade throughout 
the world. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade is founded on 
the basic premise that quantitative restrictions for the protection of the 
domestic economy and discrimination against foreign goods on the da-
mestic market are in principle prohibited (Artic1es XI and m respec-
tively) and that customs barriers are gradually to be dismantled by 
means of multilateral negotiations (for example, the Kennedy Round 
1964 and the Toyko Round 1968) (Artic1e XXVIII a).l Althougb the 
Agreement has largely contributed to the liberalization of international 
trade by harmonizing the instruments of commercial policy, it has failed 
in its attempt to de-politicize such trade. In view of the failure to ex-
press in sufficiently concrete terms the 9ccssionally ambiguous concepts 
which it contains, the function of the Agreement has scarcely evolved 
beyond providing guidelines. 
The inadequacy of world-wide organizational structures combined 
with the politica1 polarization of the world has led to the establishment 
of a broad range of regional systems of economic integration which ex-
tend from ordinary economic policy co-operation agreements concern-
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ing the creation of free-trade areasI and customs unions3 to the 
Common Market." Those systems have all declared war in one form or 
another on customs duties and charges having equivalent effect as weIl 
as on quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect. 
For the most part, they also contain a supplementary prohibition of in-
terna! taxation of a discriminatory or protectionist character. 
By comparison with an other regional economic groupings, the Eu-
ropean Community constitutes a legal and institutional innovation. It is 
more than a customs union of the classic type, i.e. an economic area in 
which customs duties and quantitative restrictions are abolished be-
tween the member countries and trade restrictions against non-member 
countries are harmonized by means of a common extemal tariff. The 
cere of the European Community is a common market which has 
achieved a high degree of integration. That market consists of a union 
of national economies forming a uniform economic area which is free 
from distortions of competition, within which obstacles to the free 
movement of goods, persons, and capital and to the freedom to provide 
services have to a large extent been abolished and whose international 
relations are conducted by an independent entity under public interna-
tionallaw with limited powers to conclude treaties.5 The Court of Jus-
tice has defined it as follows:6 
The concept of a common market . . . involves the elimination 
of an obstacles to intra-Community trade in order to merge the 
2. For example, the Agreement of 4 January 1960 establishlng a European Fr ..... 
Trade Association (EFTA); Treaty of Montevideo of 18 February 1960, establishlng a 
Latin Americ:an Free-Trade Association (LAFTA). 
3. For example, the 1964 Treaty estabUshlnc a Central African Economic and Cus-
toms Union (UDEAC), text in: 19651nt'l Leg. MaL, 699. 
4. For example, the Treaty of Managua of 13 December 1960 estabUshing a Central 
Amerlcan Common Market (CACM); Treaty of 5 May 1966 establishlng an East-African 
Economic Community (ECEA); Treaty of 2 April, 1968 establishing a Central African 
Union (UCAS); Treaty of Cbaguaramas of 4 July 1973 estabUshing a Caribbean Commu-
nity-and a Can'bbean Ccmmon Market (which dissolved the CARIFTA Free-Trade Asso-
ciation of December 1965 and May 1968). 
5. See Oplnion 1/75 of 11 November 1975, "Local Ccst Standard" [1975] ECK 1355; 
Opinion 1/76 of 26 April 1977, "Laying-up Fund for Inland Waterway Vesse1s" [1977] ECR 
741 and Opinion 1/78 of" October 1979, "International Agreement on Natural Rubber" 
[1979) ECR 287L See also the judgments of 31 March 1971 in Case 22170 AETR [19U) 
ECR 263 and of 14 July 1976 in Jolned Cases 3, " and 6/76 "Biological Resources oE the 
Sea" (1976) ECR 1279. See alsa in that regard: DaU5es, ''Rechtliche Probleme der Ab-
greDZWlg der Vertragsabschlussbefugnls der EG und der Mitgliedstaaten und die Aus-
wirkungen der verschiedenen Abgrenzunismodelle," in Ress (ed.), 
Sauveranit4tneTat4ndnis in den EuTOpd.'iscMn Gemeinschq{ten 1U (1980); Dauses, "Die 
Beteiligung der Europäischen Gemeinschaften an multüateralen Völkerrechtsüber-
einkommen," 1979 Europarec1r.t 138; Everling, "Sind die Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaft noch Herren der Verträge?," in Festschrift MO&ler 173 (1983). 
6. Judgment of 5 May 1982 in Case 15/81 Gaston Schul [1982) ECR 1409 (para. 33 of 
the decision); see also the J udgment of 9 February 1982 in Case 270/80 Polydor (1982) 
ECR 329 (para. 16 of the decision). 
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national markets into a single market bringing about condi-
tions as close as possible to those of a genuine internal market. 
The innovation however consists less in the comprehensive eco-
nomic-policy objectives pursued by the Community and in its increased 
institutional cohesion than in the unprecedented extent to which its ba-
sic principles have been given speclfic content and rendered justiclable 
by the Court of Justice in its case-law. In its decisions the Court has by 
no means interpreted the attainment of the Common Market as a mere 
programmatical statement or as a non-binding objective but as a funda-
mental legal concept which lies beyond the resch of the political deci-
sion-malters, the core of which must remain sacrosanct. In particular, 
the dynamic and evolutionary interpretation 7 which is oriented towards 
the objectives of the EEC Treaty and the coherent development of the 
structural principles specific to the Community, with direct effect and 
primacy of Community law,8 have increased the force oE the provisions 
of the Treaties and conferred upon them a new legal quallty which un-
mistakably distinguishes them from the basic structural principles of 
other economic unions, notwithstanding the identical formulation of 
some of the concepts employed. 
In the following pages the two central sets of provisions concerning 
the prohibition against levying of customs duties and charges having 
equivalent effect (Articles 9 to 17 of the EEC Treaty) and the prohibi-
tion of quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect 
(Articles 30 to 36 of the EEC Treaty) will be considered in the light of 
the judgments of the Court. At the same time, attention will be given 
in particular to trends in the deveIopment of case-law and to questions 
still in need of clarification. The distinction between the prohibition of 
the levying of custom duties and of internal taxation of a discriminatory 
or protectionist character (Articles 95 to 99 of the EEC Treaty) will also 
be touched upon. 
I. PROHIBmON OF CUSTOMS DUTIES AND CHARGES HAVING 
EQVIVALENT EFFEcT (ARTICLES 9 TO 17) 
Customs Duties 
Customs duties have long since been abolished in intra.Community 
trade except in the esse of Greece, a new Member State. Duties were to 
be abolished as between the original six Member States of the Commu-
7. See In that regard: Kutscl:ter. Met1uKls of rnterprel4titm ... SeIm "" CI Jutlge Gt the 
Courl of Jwtice (1976) (PublIeatioDS of the Court of Justic:e of the European Commwü-
tJes); Bleckmazm, "Zu den Ausleguugsmethoden des Europälschen Geriehtshofs, n 1982 
NJWU77. 
S. For example. Judgment of 5 February 1963 In Case 26/62 Van Gend &. Loos (1963) 
ECR 1; Judcment of 15 July 1964 In Case 6/64 Costa v. ENEL (1964] ECK 585; Judgment 
of 17 Dec:ember 1970 In Case 33110 SACE (1970] ECK 1213; Judcment of 19 Jan\Ulry 1982 
In Case 8/81 Becker (1982] ECR 53. 
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nity in accordance with a procedure laid down in Articles 13 to 16 of the 
EEC Treaty by the end of the first stage of the transitional period (31 
December 1961) in the case of customs duties on exports, and by the 
end of the transitional period (31 December 1969) in the case of customs 
duties on imports. In fact import duties on commercial goods had al-
ready been abolished on 1 J uly 1968 by a so-called "acceleration" deci-
sion of the Council.9 
The concept of import and export duties does not give rise to any 
legal difficulties. Customs duties are charges levied at rates speclfied in 
a customs tariff when goods cross a frontier. In the early years there 
were only a few judgments whlch bad to deal with customs duties in 
trade between the Member States. Currently the decisions which the 
Court is called upon to give are in practice concemed only with customs 
problems arising in extemal trade and involve for the most part the 
classification of certain products for tariff purposes. 
The early leading judgment in the van Gencl &- Loos case deserves 
attention, for in that case it was held inter alia' that there is also a 
breach of the standstill obligation under Article 12 of the EEC Treaty 
where t.here is a re-arrangement of the tariff resulting in the classifica-
tion of the product in question under a more highly taxed heading.10 
CJw.rges Having Equivalent Effect 
More difficu1t to grasp from a legal point of view is the concept of a 
charge, having an effect equivalent to a customs duty, which is often re-
garded as including fiseal or parafiscal charges that are not customs du-
ties in the cl"'assic sense but, like customs duties, are levied on goods on 
the occasion of or in connection with the crossing of a frontier; since 
they render those goods more expensive they bave a protectionist or 
discriminatory effect similar to that of customs duties. A judicial defini-
tion of such charges is to be found in the Marimea: judgment:ll 
. . . an charges demanded on the occasion or by reason of im-
portation which, imposed speclfica1ly on imported products and 
not on similar domestic products, alter their cast price and thus 
produce the same restrictive effect on the free movement of 
goods as a customs duty. 
The prohibition of charges baving equivalent effect, which was orig-
inally conceived by the authors of the Treaty merely as a means of 
preventing circumvention of the prohibition of customs duties, has in a 
9. Council. Decision No. 66/532/EEC of 2.6 July 1966 on the abolition of customs du-
tIes end the prohibition of quantitative restrictlons between the Member States end on 
the collection of duUes under the Common Customs Tariff for the products not listed In 
Annex n to the Treaty, Journ4l Offi.ciel 2971 (1966). 
10. Supra n. 8. 
11. Judgment 01 14 December 1972 In Case 29n2 Marlmex (1972] ECR 1309. 
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eoherent body of ease-law been constantly broadened in $Cope and has 
acquired the character of a "general clause". It now eonstitutes an aIl-
embracing, direct1y applicable basic rule which includes the prohibition 
of customs duties in the classic sense virtually only as a sort of specific 
subdivision. 
That trend in the ease-law was already indicated in the Court's 
early judgment in the "GingerbretuJ" case. According to that judgment 
the prohibition of charges havfng an effect equivalent 10 cus10ms duties, 
"far from being an exception to the general ruIe prohibiting customs 
duties, is on the contrary necessarily eomplementary 10 it and enables 
that prohibition 10 be made effeetive."12 The phrase ''necessarily eom-
plementary" must, aceording 10 the Court's general ruIes of interpreta-
tion, be eonstrued broadly. Exceptions 10 the prohibition are 
permissible only in so far as they are clearly stipulated and do not inter-
fere with the essential nature of the free movement of goods. 
Although the Gingerbrecul judgment tumed essentiallyon the fac-
tor of "discriminatorY or proteetive results", the Court rapidly moved 
away from that criterion in its later decisions. Now the only require-
ment stipulated in the case-law of the Court is the existence of a pecu-
niary charge imposed unilaterally, irrespective of i15 nature and severity 
and regardless of lts description or the manner in which it is eollected.13 
Thus an (ItaIian) statistical levy was classified as a charge having 
equivalent effeet,14 as was a compulsory contribution to a social !und for 
diamond workers which was exclusively for the benefit of the domestic 
(Belgian) eeonomy.15 
The latter decision is remarkable in several respec15. To begin 
with, it loosened the link between the imposition of the charge on the 
goods and the crossing of a frontier with the result that even a Ioose 
faetual connection between those two even15 is sufficient. Furthermore, 
the Court expressIy stated in that decision that even negligible pecuni-
8rY charges eould fall within the prohibition and that-in eontrast to 
Community eompetition law (Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty)-
nothing tums on whether the influence on cross-frontier patterns on 
trade was "appreclable".18 Finally, it is clear from that decision that the 
concept of a charge having equivalent effect does not require the charge 
12. Judgment of 14 December 1962 in Jolned Cases 2 and 3/62 Commjsslon v. Luxem-
bourg ud Belgium [l962J ECR 869. 
13. For example, Judgment of 22 March 1977 In Case 78/76 StelDlke &. WeinI18 [l9TlJ 
ECR59S. 
14. Judcment of 1 July 1969 In Case 24/68 CommlssIon v. ltaly (1969) ECR 193. 
15. Jud&ment of 1 July 1969 in Joined Cases 2 and 3/69 Sodaal Fonds voor de Dia-
mantarbelden (1969) ECK 2l.1. 
16. See also: Judgment of 19 .Tune 1973 in Cese 17/12 Capolongo (1973) ECR 611; 
Judgment of 26 February 1975 in Case 63174 Cadsky (1975) ECK 281; Judgment of 18 JUDe 
1975 In esse 9""4 IGAV (1975) ECR 699. 
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to be imposed for the benefit of the State or the product liable to the 
charge to be in competition with any domestic products. 
In several later decisions, the Court shifted the focus of the argu-
ment to the mere hindrance of trade by means of administrative for-
malities bound up with the levying of the charge, as in the case of a 
(relatively small) unloading charge in respect of imported goods un-
loaded in Italian pOrts.17 It is evident, however, that the criterion of a 
pecuniary charge is necessary in conceptual terms for the purposes of a 
charge having equivalent effect, since otherwise it might be described as 
a measure having equivalent effect (Articles 30 to 36 of the EEC 
Treaty).18 
Fees 
The EEC Treaty prohibits in intra-Community trade only the impo-
sition of customs duties and charges having equivalent effect, but not 
the collection of fees. In accordance with a distinction commonly found 
in the administrative law of all the Member States of the Community, 
fees-in contrast to charges-are levied in return for the performance 
of a specific service by the administration. 
However. fees which are in principle permissible may become pro-
hibited charges if they are levied as payment for an administrative ser-
vice performed when goods cross a frontier. In such cases the Court has 
laid down stringent requirements which must be satisfied if the fee is to 
be regarded as permissible. Only an administrative service for which a 
fee is payable and which is for the benefit of individual importers lies 
outside the scope of Articles 9 to 17 of the EEC Treaty. but not services 
provided by the authorities in the public interest. The relevant deci-
sions concerned a statistical levy on imports or exports of the goods in 
question,19 a fee levied·in respect of quality controls for exports of fruit 
and vegetable products20 and storage fees levied on the occasion of the 
customs processing of goods from other Member StateS.21 
An important group of cases in practice are those concerned with 
veterinary and public health inspection levies on imports. In principle 
these are charges having equivalent effect since the inspections are car-
ried out in the public interest and cannot therefore be regarded as a 
17. Juclgment of 10 O"tober 1973 in Case 34/73 Variola [1973] ECR 881. 
18. For example, Juclgment of 22 March 1983 in Cas. 42/82 Commission v. France 
[1983] ECR 1013. Tbe decision, whicl!. was based on Art. 30 of the EEC 1'reaty, concerned 
tbe delay resulting from systematic, adminlstrative verifications carried out free of charge 
by the Frencl!. customs aUtborlties durlng customs c1earance of ltalJen wines (''wine war 
between France end Italy"). 
19. Jl,lClgment of 1 July 1969 in Cue 24/68 Commisslon v. ltaly [1969] ECR 193. 
20. Judgment of 26 May 1975 in Case 83/74 Cadsky [1975] ECR 281. 
2L Judgments of 17 May 1983 in Case 132/82 Commtssion v. Belgium end in Case 
133/82 Commlssion v. Luxembourc (1983) ECR 1649, 1669. 
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benefit actually conferred on an individual importer.22 In concrete 
terms this means that although the carrying out of an inspection may, 
where appropriate, be covered by the exceptional provisions of Article 
36 of the EEC Treaty (see below), the absence of a comparable excep-
tion in the field of the law on charges having equivalent effect pre-
cludes the levying of fees in respect of such inspections and the cost 
thereof must therefore be borne by the Member State concerned. 
From the line of judgments in this field it is possible to elicit the 
following criteria which must be satisfied concurrently jf a pecuniary 
charge unilaterally imposed on goods when they cross a frontier is not 
to fall under the prohibition of customs duties and charges having 
equivalent effect: 
(a) it must constitute the consideration of a service actually 
provided by the administration; 
(b) the service must be provided by the administration for the 
benefit of the individual importer and not only in the pub-
lic interest; 
(c) the fee must be proportionate to the actua1 value of the 
service provided and be based on the costs incurred by the 
administration (the principle of covering costs). 
It is hard to fit into this scheme the requirement laid down in the 
recent judgment in Donner23 that the importer must have a genuine op-
tion to perform the service provided by the administration. That case 
concerned a charge imposed by the Netherlands posta! administration 
for administrative formalities in connection with the levying of turno-
ver tax on imports in such a wayas to present the recipient with afait 
accompZi upon delivery of the consignment. It follows from that judg-
ment that the possibility of performing the task oneself in the case of 
"sensitive" veruications of imports or exports is excluded by the very 
nature of such verifications. Moreover, it seems doubtful whether the 
criterion established by the Court may be regarded as another in-
dependent criterion of permissibility or whether it is to be regarded 
merely as evidence that the service provided is in fact for the obvious 
benefit of the importer. In anyevent, that judgment has clearly repudi-
ated the paternalistic concept of a negotiomm gestio by the Member 
States without regara to the real or supposed intentions of the party 
concemed. 
A special legal position pertains to fees charged for inspections, in 
22. Judgment of 14 Deeember 1912 in Case 29172 Marimex, supra D. 11; Judsment of 
11 Oetober 1973 In Cue 39173 Rewe-Zentralfinenz [l973) ECR 1039; Judgment of 5 Febru-
tIry 1916 In Case ~175 BresciaDi [1976] ECR 129; Jucfcment of 15 Deeember 1976 In Case 
35/76 Slmmenthal [1976] ECR~. In that regard, see: BOest. ''Veterinärrecbtliehe Kon-
trollen und Untersuchunpgebühren nach der EuGH-Rechtsprechunc:' 1982 Eurt>p4recht 
345. 
23. Judgment of 12 January 1983 in Case 39/82 Donner [1983] ECR 19. 
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particular public-health inspections, carried out uniformly by the Mem-
ber States pursuant to provisions of Community law. The Court of Jus-
tice has not classified them as charges having eQw.valent effect provided 
that the principle of covering costs is complied with. The reason for 
their privüeged position is that they are not imposed unilaterally by the 
Member States in order to safeguard their own interests but are im-
posed in the interests- of the Community precisely for the purpose of 
abolishing unilateral measures of the same kind and thus facilitating 
free trade.24 
Internal Ta=tion 25 
Internal taxation within the meaning of Articles 95 to 99 of the 
EEC Treaty is a pecuniary charge, llke customs duties and charges hav-
ing equivalent effect, which is not imposed to pay for a specific service 
provided by the administration. 
The EEC Treaty allowed the Member States in principle to retain 
sovereignty over internal taxation but made such taxation subject to the 
requirements of Community law. Whereas customs duties and charges 
having equivalent effect are simply prohibited in intra-Community 
trade, all that is asked of internal taxation is that it should be in a form 
consistent with the principle of neutrality in competition. No internal 
taxation may be imposed directly or indirectly on products from other 
Member States in excess of that imposed on similar domestic products 
(first paragraph of Article 95 of the EEC Treaty), and it may not be of 
such a nature as to afford indirect protection to domestic products (sec-
ond paragraph of Article 95). The distinction between intemal taxation 
on the one band and customs duties and charges having equivalent ef-
fect on the other is therefore not only a matter of legal theory but is 
also of great practical importance, since it follows from the difference in 
legal consequences that one and the same pecuniary charge cannot be-
long simultaneously to both categories. 26 
According to a common distinguishing criterion. internal taxation 
cannot, unlike customs duties and charges having equivalent effect. be 
levied on the occasion or by reason of the crossing of a frontier. How-
ever, that rule of thumb is of no further assistance where a system of 
internal taxation such as the--now partially harmonized--system of 
tumover tax (value added tax) is linked both to exclusively internal 
chargeable events (such as supplies and services provided for a consider-
24. Judgment of 25 January 1971 in Case 46/76 Bauhuls [1977] ECR 5-
25. See generally Wohlfahrt, "Steuerliche DlskrimlDierung Im GemeinSamen M .... kt, .. 
in Schwarze (ed.), Dos Wirtschqfisrecht du Gemeinmmen Marktes in der Aktuellen 
Recht.entwicklung 141 (1983); Wägenbaur, "Die Beseitigung Steuerlicher 
Diskriminierungen im Innergemelnschaftlichen Warenverkehr," 1980 RlWIAWD 121. 
26. Judgment of 18 June 1975 in ClSe 94/74 IGAV [1975] ECR 699; Judgment of 22 
M .... ch 1971 in Case 78/76 Steinike & Weinllg, supra n. 13. 
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ation within the State) and to situations involving the crossing of a fron-
tier (such as the importation of products).27 
According to the now well-established case-Iaw of the Court, such 
pecuniary charges are to be regarded as-in principle permissible-in-
terna! charges if they are "financial charges within a general sYstem of 
interna! taxation applied systematica1ly to domestic and imported prod-
ucts according to the same criteria."za One of the Treaty's objectives is 
in fact to abolish direct or indirect discrimlnation against imported 
products but not to place them in a privileged tax position in relation to 
domestic products. 
A necessary complement to that rule is that an interna1 charge 
which forms part of a general system of charges is also to be classified 
as acharge having equivaIent effect if it has the "purpose of financing 
activities for the specific advantage of the taxed domestic product"29 
(for example, in the case of a compensation fund), since in those cir-
cumstances the charges imposed on the domestic product are made good 
by that fund, wbile there is no such compensation for the imported 
product. A system of that kind, therefore, is non-discrimiJlatory in ap-
pearance only. 
For a long time it was unc1ear whether a general system of internal 
taxation "appIying systematically to domestic and imported products ac-
cording to the same criteria" is also acceptable in the absence of similar 
domestic products since in such a case the system in fact applies only to 
imported products. The Court has recentIy closed this gap by in princi-
pIe answering the question in the affirmative after some hesitation at 
the outset. Since the Member States enjoy sovereignty over interna! 
taxation, such a system of taxation is permissible if it is based on objec-
tive criteria and pursues legitimate economic policy objectives.30 
21. See Arts. 2, 5, 6 and 7 of the Sixth Council Dlrectlve of 17 May 1977 on the bar-
monizatlon of the laws oE the Member States relating to tumover taxes-Common system 
oi value-added tu: uniform basis oi assessment, O/ficüd Jouf'JUJl, No. L. 145, at 1 (1977). 
28. Judgment of 22 March 19'17 in Case '18177 Steinike und Welnlig, supra n. 13; see 
also: Judgment oE 14 December 1972 in Cese 29172 Marimex, supra n. 11. Judgment of 11 
October 1973 in Case 39173 Rewe-Zentralfinanz, supra n. 22; Judgment of 18 June 1975 In 
Case 94174 IGAV, supra n. 26; Judgment of 15 Deeember 1976 In Case 35176 Slmmenthal, 
supra n. 22; Judgment of 25 January 191'l1n Case 46176 Bauhuls, supra n. 24; Judgment of 
28 January 198110 Case 32/80 Kortmann [1981] ECR 25L 
29. Judgments oE 25 May 191110 Case 77176 Cuccbi [1977] ECR 987 end In Case lOS/ 
76 Interzuceheri [1977] ECR 1029; see also the .Judgment oE 1 July 1969 in Joined Cases 2 
end 3/69 SociaaI Fonds voor de Dlamantarbeiders, supra n. 15; Judgment of 23 Januar)' 
1915 In Cese 51/14 Hulst [1915] ECR 79. 
30. Judgments oE 14 January 1981 in Case 140179 Chemial Farmaeeuticl [1981] ECR 1 
and In Cese 46/80 VInal [1981] ECR 71; Juclgment of 3 February 1981 In Case 90179 Com-
mission v. France (1981) ECR 283. 
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11. PROHIBITION OF QUANTITATIVE REsTRICTIONS AND MEASURES 
HAVING EQUIVALENT EFFEcr (ARTICLES 30 TO 36)31 
Prohibition untier Articles 30 anti 34 
(a) Quantitative restrictions 
Unlike customs duties, quantitative restrictions (quotas and the 
like) have long sinee been abolished in trade between Member States, 
exeept in the case of Greece. In accordanee with the procedure laid 
down in Artic1es 31 to 35 of the EEC Treaty, as between the original six 
Member States of the Community, import quotas were to be abolished 
by the end of the first stage of the transitional period (31 December 
1961) and export quotas by the end of the transitional period (31 Da-
cember 1969). However, as a result of two "acceleration" declsions 
adopted by the representatives of the governments of the Member 
States meeting in the Councll,32 export quotas in respect of industrial 
products were abolished by the end of the first stage of the transitional 
period. 
The definition of the concept of quantitative restrictions, like that 
of customs duties, does not give rise to any legal difficulties. They in-
c1ude a1l national measures restricting imports or exports of goods by 
reference to value or quantity or prohibiting them in whole or in part. 
Compliance with quotas is normally ensured by the administrative au-
thorities by means of a system of import and export lieenses. Dnly a 
few cases involving quantitative restrictions on intra-Community trade 
have been brought before the Court and they are unimportant in terms 
of legal history. 
(b) Measures having equivalent effect 
Artic1e 30 et seq. of the EEC Treaty provide that not only quantita-
tive restrictions in the strict sense but a1l measures having equivalent 
effect are in principle prohibited in trade between Member States. 
The many-faceted coneept of a measure having equivalent effect 
can assume a very wide variety of legal and factual forms, such as social, 
31. In that regard see generally Funck-Brentano, ''Der Grundsatz des Freien 
Warenverkehxs im Recht der Europälschen WirtscbaIlsgemeinscbaft," 1980 RlWIAWD 
779; See Moench, ''Der Schutz des Freien Warenverkehrs Im Gemeinsamen Markt," 1982 
NJW 2689; Oliver, Pree Movement of Goods in the EEe under Article. 3D to 36 of ehe 
Rome 2reatg (1982); Oliver, "Measures 01 EquivaIent Effect: A Reappra!aaI," 19 C.M.L.R. 
217 (1982); "Barents, "New Developmenls In Measures bavIDg an Equlvalent Effect," 18 
c.M.L.R. 271 (1981); Evans, "Economic Policy and the Free Movement of Goods In EEC 
Lew," 32 LCL.Q. 577 (1983). 
32. Decislon of 12 May 1960 01 the representetives of tbe lOVerDlDenls of the Member 
Stetes of the European Econoznic Communlty meeting In the Council on acceleratlng the 
attalnment of the objectives of the Treaty, Journo.l O~l12l7 (1960); Decision of 15 
May 1962 of the representetives of the govemmenta of tbe Member Stetes of the Euro-
pean Economic Comlllunlty meeting In the Council on further acceleratlng the attalnment 
of the objectives oi the Treaty, Journal O~I128" (1962). 
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sanitary, technical, economic, pricing or publlc pollcy provisions and 
practices. The Member States have time and agam displayed an aston-
ishing range of imagination end inventiveness in introducing such non-
tariff barriers to trade especially where they needed to make good their 
balance-of-trade deficit. 
The classic, and still valid, definition of measures having equivalent 
effect was first given in the leading judgment in Dasson1>ille which is 
noteworthy also because the Court recognized that the prohibition of 
measures having equivalent effect was direct1y appllcable. The defini-
tion is as follows:33 
• • . a1l trading rules enacted by Member States which are ca-
pable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or poten-
tially, intra-Community trade . • • 
That is a remarkably wide definition. In particular, the concept of 
ac:tual or potential hindrance is capable of incluciini virtually every na-
tional measure of a legal or factua1 nature. It has been clear from the 
outset that the Court's abstract definition can be understood. only in 
conjunc:tion with the individual clrcumstances of each case. There Are 
however a number of general propositions wbich can be ellcited from 
that judgment. 
To begin with, the crucial factor is not whether an obstacle to intra-
Community trade actually exists or even whether there is an intention 
to restriet trade. Furthermore, the seriousness (appreciability) of the 
obstacle is not a factor either. Thus, for example, a system of import 
and export licenses can constitute a prohibited measure having 
equivalent effect even where such licenses are always granted upon ap-
plication, because even a mere formality can constitute a barrier to in-
tra-Community trade by reason of the delay wbich it involves and its 
dissuaslve effect on traders.34 The same holds true as regards the carry-
ing out of excessive systematic verifications of imports.35 The Court has 
also held that a measure does not have to consist of trading rules in the 
traditional sense in order to constitute a measure having equivalent ef-
fect. Thus, "any national system,"36 any "national rules or prac:tices"37 
or "a national measure"38 may be sufficient. 
However, if the concept of a .measure having equivalent effect is to 
apply, the contested rules or practice must be attributable to the Mem-
33. Jucfcment of 11 July 1974 In esse 8/14 Dassonville l1974] ECK 831. The dedsion 
concemed a national measure WIder which parallel importers were required to produce a 
certlfleate of oriJInlssued in the place of orlgin in respeet of Imports from other Member 
States. 
34. Judpent of 16 Marcl> 1917 in Case 68116 CommissIon v. France {1971] ECR 515. 
35. Judpnent of 22 Marcl> 1983 In Case 68/76 Commission v. France, id. 
36. Jucfcment of 30 October 1974 in Case 190113 Van Haaster [1974] ECK 1123. 
37. Judgment of 20 May 1976 In Case 104175 De Peijper (1976) ECK 613. 
38. Jucfcment of 12 Oetober 1978 in Case 13/18 Eggers l1978] ECK 1935. 
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ber State in its capacity as a sovereign authority. A practice carried on 
hy an individual in restraint of trade would not fall within Article 30 et 
seq. of the EEC Treaty hut might at most be assessed in the light of the 
competition rules of the EEC Treaty (Articles 85 to 90). In any event, 
the Court has drawn the dividing line between the two sets of provi-
sions not hy reference to formal legal criteria but in the light of the fac-
tual circumstances. Thus, in Treaty infringement proceedings against 
Ireland concerning an advertising campaign to promote sales of Irish 
products ("Buy Irish"), the Court considered it established that ihe 
Irish Government could be held accountable for the activities com-
plained of which, in formaIlegaI terms, were carried on hy a company 
incorporated under private law.39 
At first the Court left open the question whether the prohibition of 
measures having equivalent effect also applied to national rules or prac-
tices applied without distinetion to imported and domestic products. 
The solution to that problem was the result of a gradual and tentative 
legal process. 
In its earlier decisions the Court's main concern was the prevention 
of overt discrimination. A particularly striking illustration is provided 
by tlie Sekt-Weinbrand case decided in 1975.40 In that judgment the 
Court held that it was not permissible to reserve the generic appella-
tions "Sekt" and "Weinbrand" which enjoyed a high reputation 
amongst German consumers solely for domestic products. 
In the second stage, the aim was to eliminate not only overt but 
also disguised discrimination. That kind of discrimination covers meas-
ures which, according to formal criteria, are applicable without distinc-
tion to domestic and imported products, hut in fact place imported 
products at a disadvantage because of the special nature of the market. 
In that connection mention should be made of measures concemed with 
the formation of prices, such as the fixing of maximum or minimum 
prices which are ca1culated in such a way that either the imported prod-
ucts cannot be marketed profitably or the competitive advantage con-
ferred by the lower cost price is neutralized. 41 
A major step towards a comprehensive grasp of the concept of 
measures having equivaIent effect came with the leading judgment of 20 
February 1979 in the Cassis de Dijon case.42 In that decision, which was 
39. Judgment of 24 November 1982 In Case 249/81 Commission v. Ireland [1982) ECR 
4005. 
40. Judgment of 20 February 1974 In Case 12/74 Commission v. Germany [1975J ECR 
18L 
4L Judgments of 26 February 1976 In Jolned Cases 88-90/75 Sad8Dl [1976J ECR 323 
and In Case 65/75 Tasca [1976J ECR 291; Judgment of 24 January 1978 in Case 82177 Van 
Tiftele [19781 ECR 25. 
42. Juclgment of 20 February 1979 In Case 120178 Rewe-Zentral A.G. [l979) ECR 649. 
The referenc:e for a prellmJnary ruUng concemed the German rule on wlne to the effect 
that fruit juice liqueurs had to have a minlmum alcohol content of 25%. Thus the popular 
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viewed by specialists as decidedly revolutionary, the Court held that ob-
stacles to intra-Community trade resulting from national marketing 
provisions applicable without distinetion to domestic and imported prod-
ucts were permitted only 
in so far as those provisions may be recognized as being neces-
sary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in par-
ticular to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection 
of public health, the fairness of commercial transactions and 
the defence vf the consumer. 
Thus, an important step was made towards achieving the free 
movement of goods since the judgment contains an unequivoca1 rejec-
tion of the view wbich prevailed in academic legal writing, namely that 
obstacles to the free movement of goods based on non-discrim.inatory 
marketing provisions must be accepted as long as the field in question 
has not been "harmonized". 
In legal literature the Cassis de DiJon decision was regarded in 
some respects as extending and in others as restricting the definition 
given in the Dassonville judgment. Upon a proper view, it sbould be 
seen as a specific realization of the possibilities set out in the broad ba-
sic formula laid down in the Dassonville judgment. That is apparent in 
particular from the fact that the more recent decisions on Article 30 et 
seq. of the EEC Treaty begin as a rule by referring to both formulae. 
The Member States brought part of their legislation and adminis-
trative practices largely into Une with the new criteria, and the more 
recent decisions of the Court have centered on the problems relating to 
the consolidation of the basic rules and the defmition of their scope. 
In the initial enthusiasm generated by the introduction of that in-
novation, the fact that Article 36 of the EEC Treaty (see below) already 
takes account of health proteetion was evidently overlooked. Hence it 
was made clear in later decisions that, notwithstanding the redundant 
Cassis de Dijon criterion, health protection may-also in relation to 
rules or practices applicable without distinction to domestic and im-
ported products-be taken into consideration only in connection with 
the grounds of justification under Article 36 of the EEC Treaty. This 
means that measures in restraint of trade wbich are adopted in the in-
terests of health protection must in fact always be classified as meas-
ures having equivalent effect. 
It may be considered unsatisfactory from a legal point of view that 
Freuch Uqueur Caaris de Dijon was excludecl from the Genaan marbt. See the commen-
taries by MI1lar& In 1979 Eu~t 420; Wyatt, "State MonopoUes of • CommerciaJ. 
Character," (1980) E.L.R. 213; Wyatt, "Article 30 EEC and Non-diserimiDatory Trade Re-
strictlons," (1981) E.L.R. 185; Kovar, 1981 J. Dr. Im 106; Matter&, ''L' Amt 'Cassis de 01-
jem': une Nouvelle Approcbe pour la RealIsatIon et le Bon .FoDcUonneDlent du March6 
Interieur," 1980 Reu. M,.~ Commun 505 ff. (1980); Barents, Socfaczl.«onomüche 
Wetgelring 750 (1979); Tlmmermanns, 1981 S~üche Wetgel>ing 38L 
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the criteria of "fair trading and consumer proteetion" developed by the 
Court praeter legem must be taken into consideration in connection 
with the basic prohibition, i.e., as factors precluding its operation. It 
would have been more appropriate to treat them as merely grounds of 
justification by analogy with the matters listed in Article 36 of the EEC 
Treaty. 
Also in need of classification was the question of which "mandatory 
requirements" relating to fair trading or consumer protection and re-
ferred to in the Cassis de Dijon judgment were relevant. In that con-
nection it should be pointed 011t that under the preliminary ruling 
procedure national courts increasingly request concrete form to be 
given to non-specific basic rules. Legal writers have frequently at-
tempted to classify esses into different categories which do not purport 
to be exhaustive.43 However, the Court of Justice has refrained from 
adopting any such classification and has always decided each case on its 
ments by weighing all the relevant circumstances and in particular the 
severity of the restriction on trade. In each case it undertakes, on the 
basis of the principle of "proportionality" (rule of reason), an appraisal 
of values and interests as between the requirements of the free move-
ment of goods and the legitimate protective purpose of the contested na-
tional measure. 
According to the weIl-established case-Iaw of the Court, the princi-
pIe of proportionality requires a Member State which has a choice as to 
the means by which an objective may be achieved to "choose the means 
whlch least restrict the free movement of goods."« Thus, for example, 
the importation of a product may not be prohibited on grounds of con-
sumer protection if the consumer can be provided with sufficient infor-
mation by means of appropriate labelling.45 It is sufficient for the 
imported goods to be labelled in accordance with the relevant provisions 
of the country of manufacture, if the description printed on the label 
contains information of equivalent value to that required by the import-
ing country and is intelligible to the consumer in that Member State.46 
Several recent judgments are characterized by the tendency to re-
sist an unlimited extension of the concept of a measure having 
equivalent effect. The reason lies in the view that the Community's 
powers are in practice subject to limitations and that cases which are 
purely and simply of an internal character and do not involve the cross-
frontier movement of goods are outside the scope of the EEC Treaty. 
The turning point came with the ruling in the Horse Meat case at 
43. See Moench, supra n. 31 at 2695. 
44. Judgment of 10 November 1982 in Case 261/81 Rau [1982) ECR 3961. 
45. Id. 
46. Judgment of 16 December 1980 In Caae 27/80 Fletje [1980) ECR 3839; Judgment of 
22 June 1982 In Csse 220/81 Robertson [1982) ECR 2349. 
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the end of 1979.47 In its judgment, the Court established the criterion of 
"the specific restriction of export patterns", if only in relation to restric-
tions on exports, as a further criterion of definition. In the Court's 
opinion, that criterion was not satisfied in the case of a (Netherlands) 
rule imposing a general prohibition on the storage and processing of 
horse meat. If a critical approach to that judgment (of the Second 
Chamber of the Court) is adopted, it is legitimate to ask whether the 
overriding principle of prOportionality did not require a distinction to be 
drawn between the prolu"bition of storage and processing for domestic 
consumption, which is clearly unobjectionable under Community law, 
and the export prohibition which might be objectionable under Commu-
nitylaw. 
Three years later, the Court adopted the reasons for its ruling in 
the Horse Meat esse essentially unchanged in its decision on the prohi-
bition (in the Federal Republic of Germany) of night work in baker-
ies.48 The regulation of working hours was clearly a legitimate 
economic and social policy decision of the national legislature. But it 
was also liable to restriet exports at least indirectly, particu1arly in the 
case of fresh products which had to be prepared and delivered in good 
time for breakfast. 
The Blesgen case49 proved to be the test case on the question 
whether the criterion of the specific restriction of export patterns estab-
lished by the Horse Meat judgment also applied by analogy to restric-
tions on imports. Those proceedings for a preliminary ruling concerned 
a (Belgian) law to combat alcoholism, which prohibited the consump-
tion and stocking of spirituous beverages in all places open to the public 
and particu1arly in restaurants. The contested rules did not entail or in-
volve the crossing of a frontier, although they could undoubtedly have 
at least a marginal effect on the volume of imports. Surprisingly 
enough, the Court refused to rely on the criterion of the specific restric-
tion of import patterns. It avoided giving an unequivocal dogmatic rul-
ing and sought the justification for its decision purely and simply in the 
facts of the case. Since the prohibition related only to sale for immedi-
ate consumption on the premises in places open to the public and not to 
sale in shops, in reality it had no connection with the importation of the 
products and for that reason was not of such a nature as to restrict 
trade between the Member States. By implication, that reasoning re-
jected the proposition that the concept of a measure having equivalent 
effeet has the same scope and content as regards both restrictions on 
imports and those on exports. 
However, in an obiter dictum in the Blesgen judgment the Court 
47. Judpnent of 8 November 1979 In Case 15n9 Groenve1d [1979) ECK 3409. 
48. Judcment of 14 July 1981 In Case 155/79 Oebel }l98lJ ECR 1993. 
49. Judpnent of 31 March 1982 In Case 75/81 Blesgen [1982) ECR 1211. 
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left the door open for constructive development of that concept. Pro-
ceeding on the basis of Article 3 of Commission Directive No. 70/501 
EEC,sO the Court found that the contested rules-which were not dis-
criminatory-did not have a restrictive effect on intra-Community trade 
over and above that which was intrinsic to such rules ("effets propres"). 
Er&ception under Article 36 
Quantitative restrictions and measures having equivalent effect 
within the meaning of Articles 30 to 34 of the EEC Treaty are not pro-
hibited in so far as they are ''justified on grounds of public morality, 
publie policy and publie securlty; the protection of health and life of 
humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures possess-
ing artistie, historie or archaeological value; or the protection of indus-
trial and commercial property" (first sentence of Article 36). The seope 
of those grounds of justification is in turn curtailed by the prohibition of 
"arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade between 
Member States" (seeond sentence of Article 36). 
According to the consistent case-law of the Court, Article 36 does 
not constitute a reservation of sovereignty to the Member States but 
rather, regard being had to the objeetives of the Community constitu-
tion, an exemption which is to be interpreted strictly and must in no 
circumstances lead to circumvention of the basic prohibition on meas-
ures in restraint of trade.51 In particu1ar, it cannot be eonstrued as a 
safeguard elause against the economie effects of the opening-up of mar-
kets or even as an invitation to disguised protectionism sinee it covers 
only "eventualities of a non-economie kind which are not liable to prej-
udice the principles laid down by Articles 30 to 34."52 
Here td"o the principle of proportionality plays a dominant rölt. 
Although the Member States are at liberty to adopt measures to safe-
guard the interests listed in Article 36 in accordance with their own 
political objectives and conceptions and, in particular, to determine the 
level of protection and the rigor of controls,53 that power is subject to 
Community law. Aecordingly, only measures which "satisfy mandatory 
50. Commission Dlrective No. 70/501EEC of 22 December 1969 on the abolition of 
messures which bave an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on Imports end are 
not covered by other provisions adopted In pursuanee of the EEC Treaty (Ofjicüd Jour-
nal, English Special Edition (1), at 17 (1970). Art. 3 of tbat regulation Includes amoDg 
"measures which have an effect equivaleDt to quantitative restrictlons on imports" meas-
ures governing the marketing of products which are equally applieable to domestie and 
Imported products, where thelr restrictive effects on the free movement of goods exceed 
"the effects Intrlnsic to trade ruIes". Tb. Court of Justice has on several occasions re-
ferred to this directive as a useful guideline whi1st refus:Ing to regard it as bInding. Ac-
cordingly it may be seen merely as clarification of the Commission's programme. 
51. Judgment of 15 December 1976 In Case 35/76 Slmmenthal, supra n.22 at 1871; 
Judgment of 5 October 1977 In Case 5/77 Tedeschi [1977] ECR 1555. 
52. Judgment of 19 December 1961 in esse 7/61 CommlssloD v. ltaly [1961] ECR 317. 
53. Judgment of 20 May 1976 In Case 104/75 De Peljper, supra n. 37 at 613. 
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requirements"54 and are "strict1y necessary"55 to attain the objecüve 
pursued are justified. In effect this means that of the measures whicb 
are in themselves appropriate, the least drasüc one must be adopted, i.e. 
the one least detrimental to intra-Community trade (princlple of mini-
mum interference), and the restricüon imposed must be proportionate 
to the objecüve pursued (prohibition of over-reacüon). 
As it is, the Court has held that Artiele 36, as an exceptional provi-
sion, may not be extended by analogy to matters other than those ex-
haustively llsted in it. Therefore measures designed to ensure 
consumer protecüon and fair trading may not be based on that provi-
sion. Those interests may be taken into consideraüon only in connec-
tion with the criterion speclfied in the Cassis de Dijon judgment in 
respect of rules or pr8CÜces applicable without distincüon to domestic 
and imported products. In other words, discriminatory rules or prac-
üces can in no circumstances be justified on grounds of fair trading or 
consumer protecüon. 56 
In recent years a substantial body of case-Iaw has grown up con-
cerning the protecüon of health within the meaning of Artiele 36. The 
Court has recognized that the concept is relative, may vary in content 
from country to country and may evolve in the course of time. It has 
however always maintained that in princlple it is subject to review by 
the Court. This can occasionally-particularly in connecüon with the 
preliminary ruling procedure under Article 177 of the EEC Treaty-
create the following dilemma: on the one hand, the quesüon whether a 
product is harmful to health is a quesüon of fact the answer to which in 
proceedings involving a reference for a preliminary ruling is a matter 
for the naüonal court: on the other hand, however, the princlple of co-
operation between the Court of Justice and the court making the refer-
ence requires the former at least to assist the latter in reaching its 
decision. 
A f'U'st step towards determining the scope and definition of the in-
determinate legal concept of health protecüon for the purposes of Com-
munity law was taken by the Court in the Nisin esse (prohibition of the 
addiüon of nisin to cheese)57 and the Sandoz esse (prohibition of the ad-
diüon of vitamins to foodstuffs).58 In both of those cases, it was made 
clear that in the context of a policy for the prevenüon of disease the 
Member States may also take account of unresolved uncertainties in sei-
entific assessment. The Sandoz judgment is particularly revealing inas-
much as a (Netherlands) prohibiüon of the addiüon of vitamins to 
54. Juclgment of 20 February 1919 In Case 120m Rewe-Zentral A.G., supra D. 42-
55. Judgment of 15 December 1976 In Case 41/76 Donclterwolcke [1916] ECR 1921. 
56. JUdgment of 17 June 1981 In Case 113/80 Commlssion v Ireland [1981] ECR 1625; 
judgment of 20 April 1983 In Case 59/82 WeInvertriebs GmbH [1983] ECR 1217. 
57. Judgment of 5 February 1981 In Case 53/80 Eyssen [1981] EeR 409. 
58. JudJIDent of 14 July 1983 In Case 174/82 Sandoz [1983) ECR 2445. 
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foodstuffs was considered permissible under Community law, in so far 
as the Member State concerned allowed such foodstuffs to be put on the 
market If the addition of the vitamins met a genuine need, in particular 
of a technologica1 or nutritional nature. The question whether Article 
36 permits the adoption of measures in restraint of trade not only in the 
grey area of potential damage to health but also in the interests of a bal-
anced and natural diet (in accordance with the views expressed by the 
Netherlands and Danish Governments) remained unresolved. 
In the absence of harmonization, the Mem.ber States are in princi-
pIe at liberty to apply their own investigation and lluthorization proce-
dures to products already authorized in another Member State. In such 
a C8Se, however, the principle of proportionality requires the authorities 
of the importing State to reIy as far as possible on the results of chemi-
cal analyses or laboratory tests which have already been carried out in 
another Member State in order to avoid unnecessary duplication of 
controls.59 
As has a1ready been stated, the prohibition or restrictions author-
ized in principle by the first sentence of Article 36 may not constitute 
either a means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restrietion on 
trade between Member States. In a consistent line of decisions the 
Court has interpreted the criterion of "arbitrary discrimination" as any 
instance of unjustlfied inequality of treatment without giving the adjec-
tive "arbitrary" an independent meaning. On the other hand, it has 
construed the criterion of a "disguised restriction" as an expression of 
prohibition of abuse and has in particular subsumed under that crite-
rion instances of circumvention. 
It follows from the broad interpretation of the restriction contained 
in the second sentence of Article 36 tbat the Member States retain very 
little room for manoeuvre in relation to any measures which are not ap-
plicable without distinction to imported and domestic products. It is 
probable that, at most, such measures can be justified under Article 36 
only in exceptional situations which rarely arise. It would seem that 
the Court has so far arrived at that conclusion in only one esse (the 1m-
porlation of Pornographie Material judgment).60 The outcome of the 
comprehensive appraisal carried out in that C8Se was that the form of 
the prohibition of imports to a large extent coincided with the corre-
sponding prohibition of production and sales in the Member State. 
An important field of application of Article 36 is concemed with in-
dustrial property rights whose limited territorial effect involves frag-
mentation and isolation of national markets.81 This constitutes a source 
59. Judgment of 17 De.ember 1981 in Cue 272/SO Biologische Produkten (1981) ECR 
3277. 
SO. Judgment of 14 December 1979 in Cue 34/79 Henn end Darby (1979) ECR 3795. 
61. Industria1 properly rights have not yet been 1wmonlzed. Proposals have been 
made for llIliform Conununity rules for patents end trademarks. The Conununity Patent 
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of frequent conflicts between the principle of the free movement of 
goods and the safeguarding by the various national legal systems of 
lights deserving of protection. Tbe Court's early decisions on this point 
caused some concern, but its Te7T4pin·Te7T4nova judgment611 gave for 
the first time a coherent statement of its doctrine in this area. 
According to the now well-established case-Iaw, although the EEC 
Treaty does not affect the "existence", that is to say the essential nature 
of rights recognized by national legislation in matters of industrial and 
commerclal property, the exercise of such rights may be affected by the 
prohibitions laid down by the Treaty, since Article 36 authorizes restric-
tions on the free movement of goods only to the extent to which they 
are justified for the purpose of safeguarcUng the specific subject-matter 
of those rights.83 Rights are improperly exercised in the following four 
cases: 
Where the proprietor of the industrial property light, who en-
joys parallel rights in a number of Member States. prohibits 
the importation of a product which has lawfully been marketed 
in another Member State by the proprietor bimself or with bis 
consent;84 
Where the light relied on is the result of the subdivision, by 
voluntary aet or as a result of public constraint, of an industrial 
property light which originally belonged to one and the same 
proprietor;6S 
Where the exercise of the right is the purpose, the means or 
the result of an agreement prohibited by the Treaty;66 
Where the exercise would constitute a disguised restriction on 
trade between the Member States. Such is the case in particu-
lar when the assertion of the light by the proprietor "having 
regard to the marketing system which he has adopted, will con-
tribute to the artificial partitioning of the markets between 
Member States.67 
Convention ("Convention tor the Europem Patent tor the Common Market") of lS Oe-
cember 1975 (Ofjicüd Jount4l. No. L 17, at 1 (1976» Iaying down the law relatlng to pat-
ents for invention oolDlDOn to the Member States with unitary and autonomoUi effect ls 
not yet In fMCe. "" regards trade-marks, In 1980 the Commlssion submitted two proposa!s 
for a CoUDcIl regulation On the Community trade-mark and a ffrst Councll clirective to 
harmonize the trade-mark law of the Member Stetes. 
62. Juclgment of 22 JUDe 1976 In, Case 119/75 Terrapin v. Terranova (1976) ECR 1039. 
63. Juclgment of S July 1974 In Case 192nS Hag [1974] ECR 131; Judgment of 31 Octo-
ber 1974 In Case 115n4 Cenuafarm v. Sterling Drug [1974] ECR 1147; Jucl&ment of 22 JUDe 
1976. supra n. 62. 
64. Juclgment of 31 October 1974, id.; Judgment of 22 JUDe 1976. id.; Juclgment of 14 
September 1982 In Case 144181 Keurkoop (1982] ECR 2853. 
65. Juclgment of 3 July 1974, supra n. 63. Juclgment of 22 June 1976, supra D. 62-
68. Juc!gment of 22 June 1976. supra n. 62; Judgment of 14 September 1982, supra D-
64. 
67. Juclgment of 23 May 1978 in Case 102177 Hoffmann·La Rache v. Centrafarm 
(1978) ECR 1139. 
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That basic pattern for the relationship between the free movement 
of goods 8nd industrial or commercial property rights has been system-
atically confirmed in recent judgments in respect of copyrights68 and 
"product imitation". 69 Moreover the Court has held in the GEMA case 
that "exhausted" copyrights can also not be re1ied. upon to demand pay-
ment of additional fees based on the difference between the usual royal-
ties paid in the country of importation and the lower royalties paid in 
the producer country.70 . 
SUMMARY AND FuRTHER REFLExIONS 
In its case-Iaw the Court of Justicehas further developed the prin-
ciples of the free movement of goods into an extensive network of rules. 
It seems charaeteristic of the present state of Community law that the 
weight of the "classic" prohibitions of customs duties and quantitative 
restrictions has shifted perceptibly to the complementary prohibitions 
of charges or measures having equivalent effed. The Court has by no 
means construed them as mere secondary rules designed to cover cases 
of clrcumvention, but has attributed to them the status of general 
provisions. 
This "integrationist" case-Iaw is the result of a system of interpre-
tation displaying the charaeteristics of constitutional law rather than 
those of internationallaw. The specific Community pattern of ruIe and 
exception, whereby the basic pillars of the system of integration are 
given a broad interpretation, while exceptions thereto and derogations 
therefrom are interpreted restrictively, has reversed the traditional 
maxims of interpretation derived from public international law which 
ware most clearly expressed in the much quoted dictum in the Lotus 
judgment of the Permanent Court of International Justiee to the effect 
that "restrictions upon the independenee of States cannot . • • be pre-
sumed."n That reversal has enabled the Court, in appraising values 
and interests as between the requirements of the free movement of 
goods and the restrictive effects on trade of national policies, to give 
precedence to the former over the latter. 
While it may be inappropriate to describe the case-Iaw of the Court 
as bearing the imprint of a particular coneept of commercial or eeo-
nomic policy, there is no doubt that the wealth of cases decided in ae-
cordance with the theory of a market economy has eontributed to the 
attainment of a degree of trade liberalization which comes close to the 
ideal of a uniform internal market. Thus the economic benefits of com-
68. Judgment of 20 J8Iluary 1981 in Joined Cues 55/80 end 57/80 GEMA [1981] ECR 
147; Judgment of 22 January 1981 In Case 58180 Dansk Supermarked [1981] ECR 18L 
69. Judgment of 2 March 1982 In Case 6181 Beele [1981J ECR 707. 
70. Judgment of 20 January 1981, supra 0.68. 
7L P.C.I.J. Series A. No. 10 (1927). 
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petition in a market economy and in particular the possibility of making 
optimum use of the factors of production throughout the Community 
have been assured. This means greater rationalization and efficiency of 
the basic structural principles of the Treaty, transparency with regard 
to access to markets and greater legal certainty 80d legal protecüon for 
individual citizens in the Common Market. 
In parücular, the Court's pioneering judgment in the CtU8is de Di-
jon esse and its subsequent decisions clarifying it and extending its 
scope represent a quantum leap towards the achievement of the objec-
tives of the Treaty and have anticipated countless harmonization direc-
tives. Nevertheless, various problems raised by that landmark decision 
still await clarification. 
It js questionable whether not only rules and practices applicable 
without distinction to domestic and imported products hut also meas-
ures which, while not being applicable without distinction to such prod-
ucts, are not discriminatory, can escape the application of the 
prohibition laid down by Articles 30 and 34 of the EEC Treaty. It js 
common knowledge that the concept of discrimination js narrower than 
that of düferent treatment since, according to the estahlished case-law 
of the Court, it applies only to instances of objectively unjusüfied dis-
similar treatment of simllar situations.72 Logically, the criterion estab-
lished by the Cassis de Dijon judgment should be further developed so 
as to cover measures of any kind which are not discriminatory. In 80y 
event, ooly in exceptional situations js it possible to imagine instances of 
objectively jusüfied unequal treatment ~ which are not in one 
form or another tantamount to disguised restricüons designed to protect 
domestic production. One should bear in mind, for example, the bor-
derline cases in which what in formal terms constitutes unequal treat-
ment actually leads, on account of the particular nature of the market, 
to placing imported products and domestic products on the same foot-
ing. That can occur ooly in a very small number of esses, as was very 
clearly shown in two recent decisions where the argument advanced by 
the Member States to the effect that the different treatment was in the 
interests of effective consumer protection fell on deaf ears.73 
The relationship between the rules on the free movement of goods 
72. For exampIe, Judcment of 19 October 1977 in Jolned Cases 117/76 and 16111 
Quellmebl [l977] ECR 1753 and Jn Joined Cases 124/76 and 20177 "Malze groats and mea1" 
(1977) ECR 1795. 
73. Judgment of 17 June 1981 in Case 113/80 CommIssIon v. Ireland, supra n. 56; 
under the contested Irlsh legislation Imported souvenirs whlch in appelU'ance were I1kely 
to be taken as souvenirs from Ireland ware required to bear an indication of the country 
of orlgin; Juclcment of 29 November 1983 In Case 181/82 Roussel Laboratories, [1983) ECR 
3849: thls cese was c:oncemed with Netherlands legWation on the prices of medicines in 
whlch the purchase price of domestically-produced mecUeinelI was based on the prIce of 
such mediclnes at a given date whilst that of imported products was based on the selUng 
prlce of such products in the CQuntry of manufaetUl'e. 
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and the provisions for the approximation of laws contained in Articles 
100 to 102 of the EEC Treaty has not yet been clarified conclusively. 
Some contradictions and some degree of overlappjng between the two 
sets of rules are inevitable. In accordance with the consistent esse-law 
of the Court, recognition of the powers vested in the political institu-
tions of the Community in the matter of harmonization must not lead 
to a situation in which. in the absence of directives on the approxima-
tion of laws, obstacles to the free movement of goods are allowed to pel'-
sist. In no circumstances may the essential nature of the free 
movement of goods be interfered with. 
That seems plausible enough, but it may lead to difficulties when 
applied to individual esses since it is obvious that the integration of na-
tional markets pursued by the Treaty cannot be achieved only by the 
direct application of the basic rules governing the free movement of 
goods. The domaine reserve of the exceptions set forth in Article 36 of 
the EEC Treaty and further extended in the Cassis de Dijon judgment 
can be contained within reasonable limits only if the protective aims of 
domestic rules on production and marketing and the means used for the 
attainment of those ajzns are at least substantially co-extensive. 
In the first place, it must not be forgotten that in the nature of 
things there are limits to the finding of the law by the Court notwith-
standing the far-reacbing effects which that process has in the shaping 
of the law. Pragmatic decisions untainted by ideology can rectify errors 
and close gaps, but they cannot be a substitute for Community 
legislation. 
Second. it ~comes apparent precisely in times of crisis that respon-
sibility for safeguarding the level of integration achieved must not be 
left exclusively to the political institutions of the Community. It is to 
the credit of the Court of Justice that in this area of tension between 
political co-responsibility and judicial self-restramt, it has always un-
swervingly adhered to the ultimate goal of a unified market. This is 
brought out most forcefully in a recent judgment concerning an in-
fringement of the Treaty:T4 
The fundamental principle of a unified market and its corol-
lary, the free movement of goods, may not under any circum-
stances be made subject to the condition that there should first 
be an approximation of national laws for if that condition bad 
to be fulfilled the principle would be reduced to a mere cipher 
. . . The elimination of quantitative restrietions and measures 
baving an equivalent effect, which is unreservedly affirmed in 
Article 3(a) of the Treaty and carried into effect by Article 30, 
may not therefore be made dependent on measures which, 
14. Judgment of 9 Dec:ember 1981 In Case 193/80 CommisSion v. ltaly [1981J ECR 3019 
at 3033. 
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although capable of promoting the free movement of goods, 
cannot be considered to be a necessary condition for the appli-
catlon of that fundamental princlple. 
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